Health Law and Administrative Law: A Marriage Most Convenient by Jost, Timothy Stoltzfus
Saint Louis University Law Journal 
Volume 49 
Number 1 Administrative Law Meets Health 
Law: Inextricable Pairing or Marriage of 
Convenience? (Fall 2004) 
Article 3 
12-1-2004 
Health Law and Administrative Law: A Marriage Most Convenient 
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Timothy S. Jost, Health Law and Administrative Law: A Marriage Most Convenient, 49 St. Louis U. L.J. 
(2004). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol49/iss1/3 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more 
information, please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
1 
HEALTH LAW AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: 
A MARRIAGE MOST CONVENIENT 
TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST* 
This symposium explores the complex relationship between health law and 
administrative law.  It is based on the observation that these two fields of law 
are peculiarly intertwined.  It attempts to understand why this is so, as well as 
whether it is necessary and whether it is desirable. Would we as a society, that 
is, be better off if health law were less permeated by administrative law?  Even 
if we would be better off, is it indeed possible to extricate health law from 
administrative law? 
This essay begins by defining health law and administrative law.  It then 
proceeds to describe the function of law, the institutions through which law is 
made and applied, and how law is made and applied in the health-care 
industry, demonstrating the prominent role of administrative entities in health 
care. It next examines why the close relationship between health law and 
administrative law exists.  In particular, it considers and rejects the thesis that 
this close relationship is an artifact of history.  The article goes on to develop 
an alternative hypothesis that administrative entities play a major role in 
overseeing the delivery and finance of health care because of the need for such 
oversight and the lack of superior institutional alternatives.  This essay 
concludes by considering why this permeation of health law by administrative 
law is likely to continue, and why this may not be such a bad result. 
I.  WHAT IS HEALTH LAW?  WHAT IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW? 
To begin this exploration, we must define our terms.  Health law and 
administrative law describe domains of law, but they represent different 
approaches to classification.  Health law encompasses law as it affects a 
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particular industry—the health-care industry.1  For the purposes of this article, 
I define health law to include law that governs the relationships among health-
care providers, professionals, patients, and the government with respect to the 
organization, provision, and financing of health care.  It is, therefore, neither a 
distinct body of substantive law nor of procedural law, but rather a very broad 
and disparate category, tied together only by the fact that it includes law that 
governs a particular industry.  Because that industry, however, is our largest 
industry,2 encompassing nearly one-seventh of our economy,3 and intimately 
affecting each of our lives on a regular basis—occasionally literally in matters 
of life and death—the law that governs this industry is of vital importance. 
The emergence of health law as a distinct body of law is relatively recent.  
The study of medical law—forensic medicine and medical negligence—dates 
back to the nineteenth century, while bioethics emerged as a field of study in 
the 1970s.4  Health law, as broadly defined above, began to appear as a distinct 
area of practice in the 1960s and 1970s, and health law as a self-conscious 
academic discipline in the 1970s and 1980s.5 The first casebook designed to 
teach health law appeared in 1987.6  At the present time, most major law firms 
have a health law department, while virtually every law school has at least one 
health law course and many law schools have several such courses. 
While health law is defined in terms of the industry that it addresses, 
administrative law is commonly defined in terms of the nature of the entities 
that it governs.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines administrative law as “the law 
governing the organization and operation of the executive branch of 
government (including independent agencies) and the relations of 
administrative agencies with the legislature, the executive, the judiciary, and 
the public.”7  A leading administrative law text offers a similar definition: 
“[A]dministrative law consists of those legal principles that define the 
authority and structure of administrative agencies, specify the procedural 
formalities that agencies use, determine the validity of administrative 
 
 1. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS xvii 
(1987). 
 2. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 497 (5th 
ed. 2004) (“In 2000, Americans spent $1173.9 billion on personal medical care compared to 
$958.8 billion on housing, $928.5 billion on food and tobacco, and $784.9 billion on 
transportation.”). 
 3. Uwe E. Reinhardt et al., U.S. Health Care Spending in an International Context, 23 
HEALTH AFF. 10, 11 (2004).  In 2001, health spending accounted for 13.9% of the gross domestic 
product of the United States.  Id. 
 4. PETER D. JACOBSON, STRANGERS IN THE NIGHT: LAW AND MEDICINE IN THE MANAGED 
CARE ERA, 27–30, 49–55 (2002). 
 5. Id. at 46–47; Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Uses of the Social Transformation of American 
Medicine: The Case of Law, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 799 (2004). 
 6. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 1. 
 7. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 48 (8th ed. 2004). 
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decisions, and outline the role of reviewing courts and other organs of 
government in their relation to administrative agencies.”8 
These broad definitions obviously encompass the law that governs or 
emerges from traditional regulatory agencies that oversee private conduct 
through traditional command-and-control regulation.9  They could indeed 
include all of public law, except for criminal law, which is traditionally carved 
out as a separate domain.  Even an understanding of administrative law this 
broad, however, might be too narrow to serve our purposes.  This is because of 
the nature of health-care administrative law. 
In fact, traditional command-and-control regulation plays a relatively small 
role in health-care law.  Certainly, several of the classic federal command-and-
control regulatory agencies do have jurisdiction over the health-care industry.  
The Federal Trade Commission, for example, polices trade restraints within the 
health-care industry,10 while the National Labor Relations Board oversees 
collective bargaining within health-care institutions.11  Several federal 
executive departments also have regulatory jurisdiction over the health-care 
industry, including the Labor Department, which regulates ERISA health 
benefits plans.12  Regulatory law also imposes general prohibitions that set the 
backdrop for licensing or certification requirements.  Unauthorized practice of 
medicine, for example, is prohibited by state law, and medical licensing boards 
have the authority to interpret and enforce these prohibitions.13  Similarly, the 
sale of drugs that have not been approved by the federal Food and Drug 
 
 8. STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: 
PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 3 (5th ed. 2002). 
 9. The term “command-and-control regulation” is commonly used as though its meaning 
were self-evident.  Perhaps the closest one can come to a definition of it, however, is Cass 
Sunstein’s descriptions of it: 
Congress has often employed command-and-control strategies to accomplish various 
regulatory goals, most notably to clean the air and water.  Command-and-control 
strategies seek to direct private behavior through centralized national bureaucracies.  
Often they require all or most industries to adopt inflexible, legally identified methods of 
achieving compliance within specified times. 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 
87 (1990). 
 10. Although the jurisdiction of the FTC only extends to for-profit corporations, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 44–45 (2000), this limitation has been interpreted so as to recognize jurisdiction over trade 
associations that operate as non-profits but that confer economic benefits on their members.  Cal. 
Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 765–69 (1999). 
 11. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW §§ 4-14 to -19, at 115–19 (2d ed. 2000).  
Certain special rules apply to health care institutions, however, such as NLRB rules governing 
bargaining units in acute-care hospitals.  29 C.F.R. § 103.30 (2003). 
 12. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503–1 (2003) (providing the Labor Department’s rules on 
ERISA claims determinations and appeals). 
 13. FURROW ET AL., supra note 11, § 3-3, at 62. 
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Administration (FDA) is prohibited by the Food and Drug and Cosmetic Act.14  
And much of modern environmental and health and safety legislation grows 
out of state and local public health laws, one of our earliest forms of command-
and-control regulation.  But the exercise of command-and-control regulatory 
authority, independent of licensing requirements or payment conditions, is not 
characteristic of modern health-care law. 
Much more common in health-care law are three other approaches to 
regulation.  First, there are health-care financing and tax subsidy programs, 
which use administrative entities to assure the quality of services, oversee 
proper billing and utilization, and deter and punish fraud and abuse.  The 
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services exercises tremendous power over 
the health-care industry through the certification, coverage, and payment rules 
that it enforces in connection with its administration of the hundreds of billions 
of dollars spent by the Medicare and Medicaid programs on services provided 
by health-care professionals, suppliers, and providers.15  The Office of 
Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services and 
Department of Justice, moreover, enforce additional rules against the same 
professionals, providers, and suppliers under their authority to enforce 
compliance with the fraud and abuse laws, including the false claims and anti-
kickback prohibitions.  The Internal Revenue Service exerts considerable 
authority over the operation of hospitals and other health-care institutions 
through its interpretation of the laws granting tax-exempt status to “charitable” 
institutions,16 and over employee benefit plans through its administration of 
laws offering tax subsidies to employers who offer and employees who enroll 
in such plans.17  These regulatory interventions are not imposed under the 
Commerce Power, like antitrust laws or ERISA, but rather are imposed under 
the taxing or spending powers on private entities that choose to participate in 
federal health-care financing and subsidy programs.  Some of these regulatory 
provisions, such as Medicare payment rules, are necessary adjuncts of 
government spending programs; others, such as the Emergency Medical 
 
 14. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000). 
 15. The President’s budget for FY 2005 projects Medicare expenditures at $290 billion and 
the federal share of the Medicaid program at $182 billion.  KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND 
THE UNINSURED, THE PRESIDENT’S FY 2005 BUDGET PROPOSAL: OVERVIEW AND BRIEFING 
CHARTS, 1–2 (June 2004), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/7115.cfm. 
 16. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000); FURROW ET AL., supra note 11, ch. 2, § 2-1 to -16, at 
38–50. 
 17. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 105(h) (2000) (limiting the ability of self-insured plans to 
discriminate in favor of highly compensated individuals).  The expansion of tax subsidies for new 
health-care financing vehicles, such as Health Savings Accounts created by the Medicare 
Modernization Act, 26 U.S.C.A. § 223 (2004), portends a greater regulatory role for the I.R.S. 
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Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA)18 and the former federal health 
planning laws, are much more tangentially related to federal spending 
programs but are enforced through these spending programs. 
Second, there are licensure and certification programs.  In general, health-
care professionals cannot practice their profession within a state unless they are 
licensed (or in some instances certified) by the proper board or agency, and, 
once licensed, health-care professionals must comply with the rules of these 
boards or agencies or risk disciplinary action.19  Any pharmaceutical company 
that wants to market a new drug or medical device manufacturer that wants to 
introduce a new device must obtain approval from the FDA.20  To obtain and 
retain this license or approval, the applicant must conform to certain statutory 
and regulatory requirements, which are not imposed as general “commands” 
upon society, but rather as conditions of licensure, certification, or approval 
with respect to particular professionals, providers, or manufacturers. 
The third regulatory model that pervades health care is regulation through 
private entities.  While private regulation has recently been discovered by 
administrative law scholars,21 those of us who work with health law have 
known about it for decades.22  Although the theme of private regulation will be 
explored in detail below,23 a few illustrative examples demonstrate this point.  
The Medicare program is governed by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS), a large government agency located within an executive 
department and subject to a complex body of statutes and regulations, but the 
day-to-day operation of the program is carried out by private Medicare 
contractors, which make their own rules (Local Medicare Review Policies) 
under “rulemaking” procedures specified by statute.24  Medicare contractors 
 
 18. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000).  See also Dean M. Harris, Beyond Beneficiaries: Using the 
Medicare Program to Accomplish Broader Public Goals, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1251, 1273–
82 (2003). 
 19. Timothy S. Jost, Oversight of the Competence of Healthcare Professionals, in 
REGULATION OF THE HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONS 17, 21–26 (Timothy S. Jost ed., 1997). 
 20. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000). 
 21. See, e.g., Symposium, Public Values in an Era of Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1211 
(2003); Jack M. Beermann, Administrative-Law-Like Obligations of Private[Ized] Entities, 49 
UCLA L. REV. 1717 (2002); Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (2003); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000). 
 22. See, e.g., Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals: 
Private Regulation of Health Care and the Public Interest, 24 B.C. L. REV. 835 (1983). 
 23. See infra text accompanying notes 46–59. 
 24. CENTER FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICARE PROGRAM INTEGRITY 
MANUAL: LOCAL MEDICAL REVIEW POLICY, available at http://www.cms.gov/manuals/ 
108_pim/pim83toc.asp (last modified Sept. 16, 2004).  See Timothy S. Jost, The Medicare 
Coverage Determination Process in the United States, in HEALTHCARE COVERAGE 
DETERMINATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE STUDY 207, 212–13 (Timothy S. Jost 
ed., 2005). 
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also make coverage adjudications, subject to review by separate private 
“qualified review organizations,” whose determinations are in turn subject to 
administrative and judicial review.25  Clinical research can only be approved 
for federal funding in the United States, and clinical trials can only be 
approved as adequate to support Food and Drug Administration new drug 
approvals, if the clinical research or trials are approved by Institutional Review 
Boards (IRBs), which are private entities constituted in accordance to federal 
regulations that must follow procedures established by federal regulations.26  
Hospitals that are accredited by the private Joint Commission on Accreditation 
of Healthcare Organizations can participate in the Medicare program by 
meeting only minimal additional requirements,27 while managed care 
organizations that are accredited can escape certain regulatory requirements in 
some states.28  Hospitals that make staff privilege decisions29 or ERISA plans 
that make coverage decisions30 are required by the courts to follow procedures 
that are essentially administrative, and the courts treat their decisions with 
much the same deference afforded the decisions of administrative agencies. 
A comprehensive definition of administrative law, therefore (at least with 
respect to health law), must include not only the law that emerges from or 
governs public agencies that engage in command-and-control regulation, or 
even all public governmental agencies (including licensing and certification 
agencies and agencies that oversee health-care financing or tax-subsidy 
programs), but also the law that controls all “tools of government,” including 
private or quasi-public entities that carry out government functions.31  I define 
“administrative law,” therefore, idiosyncratically for this article to include law 
that emerges from or governs entities (public or private) other than the courts 
or legislatures that are rather created or sanctioned by law to carry our public 
regulatory functions or to collect and expend public resources. 
Common salient characteristics of such entities, explored further below, 
are that they are usually designated to carry out public functions because of 
special claims to competence or expertise; their acts and decisions are 
supposed to serve (at least in part) the public interest; their adjudicatory 
 
 25. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b)(1), (c)–(d) (2000). 
 26. 21 C.F.R. §§ 56.101(a), 56.103 (2004); 45 C.F.R. § 46.109(a) (2003). 
 27. 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb (2000); 42 C.F.R. § 488.5 (2003). 
 28. See Barry R. Furrow, Regulating the Managed Care Revolution: Private Accreditation 
and a New System Ethos, 43 VILL. L. REV. 361, 396–99 (1988) (describing managed care 
accreditation). 
 29. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 11, § 4-5 to -6, at 101–105. 
 30. See Mark D. DeBofsky, The Paradox of the Misuse of Administrative Law in ERISA 
Benefit Claims, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 727, 727–32 (2004). 
 31. See generally THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE 
(Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002) (describing many of the administrative tools utilized by 
government). 
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decisions are usually subject ultimately to judicial review; that judicial review 
is generally deferential because of the entities’ special claims to competence; 
these entities are usually authorized to promulgate rules, standards, or 
guidelines formally or informally; the “rules” that they promulgate are often 
made through processes that include some element of public participation; 
their “rules” are usually afforded some deference by the courts; and their acts 
are often subject to some level of public scrutiny.  These characteristics, of 
course, are those described in the federal and state administrative procedure 
acts,32 even though those laws may not apply to all of the entities swept within 
our broad definition of administrative law. 
II.  LAW AS MAKING RULES AND DECIDING DISPUTES AND THE INSTITUTIONS 
THAT MAKE RULES AND DECIDE DISPUTES IN HEALTH CARE 
The understanding of what is meant by administrative entity and by 
administrative law that is adopted here is based on an underlying 
understanding of the nature of law and of how law functions.  To grossly 
oversimplify matters that jurisprudes debate endlessly, law serves two basic 
purposes in society.  First, it establishes (or recognizes) enforceable rules by 
which individuals and entities order their relationships with each other and 
with society.33  These rules may be based on the underlying norms under 
which private and public relationships are in fact conducted, they may reflect a 
misunderstanding or distortion of those norms,34 or they may be shaped by a 
conscious attempt to create new norms or change existing norms to serve a 
particular public purpose.35  Second, law provides institutions that serve to 
settle disputes among individuals and entities and between those individuals 
and entities and the state.36  These two purposes are, of course, closely 
interrelated, as rules may emerge from the settlement of disputes, while the 
settlement of disputes presupposes rules with reference to which those disputes 
can be resolved.  But it is sometimes useful to recognize these two functions as 
separate. 
 
 32. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 554, 702, 706 (2000). 
 33. See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, 79–99 (2d ed. 1994); Frederick Schauer, 
Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 510 (1988) (describing the rule-setting function of law). 
 34. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES, 280–86 (1991); Robert C. Ellickson, A Critique of Economic and Sociological 
Theories of Social Control, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 67 (1987) (describing the relationship between 
law and norms). 
 35. The possibility of law serving a “meliorative function,” striving to achieve a more just 
society, can be understood as a third role of law.  See Steven D. Smith, Reductionism in Legal 
Thought, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 68, 73–75 (1991). 
 36. K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 11–12 (3d prtg. 
1960); see also Smith, supra note 35, at 69–71. 
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Given common notions of institutional competence, we primarily think of 
the elected legislative bodies as laying down rules by enacting laws (usually 
with some participation from the executive) and of the courts as settling 
disputes by deciding cases.  However, rules are laid down and disputes 
resolved generally in our society through four different types of institutions.  
First, legislatures establish rules through enacted legislation.  In doing so they 
often also incidentally settle disputes, as when a local city council imposes a 
final resolution on a contentious re-zoning dispute.  Second, courts do indeed 
resolve disputes in both civil disputes among private individuals and 
institutions as well as disputes between government and individuals that are 
litigated in criminal or civil enforcement cases.  In our common law legal 
system, courts also articulate rules, interpret and apply statutes and 
constitutions, and find the common law when there is no statute or 
constitutional provision on point.37 
Third, rules are articulated and disputes settled through private 
arrangements.  Private individuals, through contracts and by the formation of 
private entities such as partnerships and corporations, create rules that are 
legally enforceable among themselves.  These generally reflect the norms that 
govern society and are shaped by the market forces affecting commercial 
transactions.  Private individuals and entities also reach legally binding 
resolutions of disputes through negotiation, mediation, and arbitration. 
Finally, a great many rules are laid down and disputes resolved by 
administrative entities, as broadly defined above.  These entities make rules 
that govern private conduct (as well as their own conduct) through formal or 
informal rulemaking procedures.38  These entities also formally and informally 
decide disputes.  These disputes usually involve regulatory enforcement (or the 
raising or expenditure of public funds), but can also include disputes among 
private parties (for example, where the NLRB decides a collective bargaining 
dispute or the Office of Civil Rights of the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development decides a housing discrimination claim). 
Health law offers many examples of rules made and disputes resolved 
through each of these mechanisms.  Congress has enacted a host of statutes 
affecting the organization and finance of health care, sometimes as 
freestanding legislation, but often as part of omnibus budget bills.  Some of the 
better-known examples of this legislation are the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),39 the Emergency Medical Treatment and 
Active Labor Act (EMTALA),40 and the Health Insurance Portability and 
 
 37. LLEWELLYN, supra note 36, at 12. 
 38. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000) (governing rulemaking by federal agencies). 
 39. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1411 (2000). 
 40. 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb (2000). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2004] HEALTH LAW AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 9 
Accountability Act (HIPAA).41  State legislatures also regularly enact new 
legislation affecting health care. 
The state and, to a lesser degree, federal courts are continually resolving 
disputes involving health-care issues.  Important sectors of health law, notably 
malpractice and informed-consent law and much of bioethics, are governed by 
the common law that the courts have established. 42  Criminal prosecutions and 
civil penalty proceedings brought in the courts have also taken on an 
increasingly important role in health care in recent years. 
Private contracts and institutional arrangements governing relationships 
between professionals, providers, and patients are ubiquitous in health care.43  
The use of private alternative dispute resolution approaches, including 
mediation, arbitration, and negotiation has also become common in health care. 
But, much of health law is administrative law, created and applied by 
administrative entities as described above.  These include traditional federal 
regulatory agencies and commissions, as well as the federal entities that 
oversee federal health-care financing and tax-expenditure programs.  They also 
include a host of state boards and agencies that license and regulate health-care 
professionals and health-care institutions, such as hospitals or nursing homes.  
States are primarily responsible for regulating health insurance as recognized 
by the McCarran-Ferguson Act.44  States actively exercise this power to 
guarantee the capacity of insurers to meet their obligations and supervise 
insurance claims practices, while at the same time attempting to regulate 
insurance underwriting to expand access to insurance.45 
As noted above, federal and state regulatory authority, exercised through 
command-and-control regulation or federal spending authority, tax subsidies, 
and licensing and certification authority, does not begin to exhaust the scope of 
administrative oversight over the health-care industry.  A complete description 
must also include the private and quasi-private entities that either exert public 
authority over the health-care industry or are overseen by public law in their 
private oversight of the health-care industry. 
First, and most obviously, there are private entities essentially created by 
federal or state law to extend public oversight over the health-care industry.  A 
prime example are Institutional Review Boards (IRBs), whose membership 
 
 41. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996). 
 42. See Lawrence Gostin, The Formulation of Health Policy by The Three Branches of 
Government, in SOCIETY’S CHOICES: SOCIAL AND ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN BIOMEDICINE 
335, 339–345 (Ruth Ellen Bulgaer et al. eds., 1995) (describing the role of the courts in 
healthcare policy-making). 
 43. Indeed, private arrangements have arguably become more important in recent years as 
“transactional” work, arranging relationships between health-care professionals and institutions, 
has become a major focus of health law practice.  See FURROW ET AL, supra note 2. 
 44. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011, 1012, 1015 (2000). 
 45. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, ch. 9, at 566–643. 
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and function are specified by federal law.46 These IRBs possess authority 
primarily because their approval is necessary if research is to be funded by the 
federal government or will result in regulatory approvals issued by the federal 
Food and Drug Administration.47 
Second, there are pre-existing private entities that contract with the 
government to carry out regulatory responsibilities of the government.  In this 
category must be placed Medicare contractors, who are generally insurers and 
data processors who make local coverage and medical review policies and 
process and pay Medicare claims.48  Also included are Medicare and Medicaid 
HMOs that are often commercial insurers that administer public managed-care 
plans in addition to their private business, but which, in doing so, act in the 
place of the state in administering public insurance programs.49  Finally there 
are Medicare Quality Review Organizations, which are private entities 
carrying out public quality and utilization review responsibilities under 
contract with the Medicare program.50 
Third, there are private entities that have effectively been commandeered 
by the government to carry out public regulatory responsibilities even though 
they do not necessarily do this under contract.  The prime example of this 
phenomenon is private accreditation bodies.  The Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations was established more than a decade 
before the Medicare program and grew out of the Hospital Standardization 
Program that antedated Medicare by at least a half-century.51  When the 
Medicare program was created, however, it incorporated JCAHO (then Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals or JCAH) accreditation, extending 
Medicare certification to accredited hospitals.52  State hospital licensure laws 
have also incorporated JCAHO accreditation; indeed, in some states, 
accredited hospitals are effectively licensed automatically.53  In more recent 
years, both federal and state regulatory authorities have turned to other 
accreditation programs, including JCAHO and the National Committee for 
Quality Assurance (NCQA), to oversee the quality of health insurers and 
 
 46. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101–124 (2003) (describing the role of IRBs in approving research 
involving human subjects, their composition and procedures). 
 47. 21 C.F.R. §§ 56.101–124 (2004). 
 48. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395h, 1395u (2000). 
 49. See Grijalva v. Shalala, 152 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 1998), vacated by 526 U.S. 1096 (1999) 
(recognizing Medicare HMOs as public actors subject to the Constitution). 
 50. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c-1 to -12 (2000); See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Administrative Law 
Issues Involving the Medicare Utilization and Quality Control Peer Review Organization (PRO) 
Program: Analysis and Recommendations, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1989) (analyzing administrative 
law issues with respect to Medicare Peer Review Organizations). 
 51. Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Medicare and the Joint Commission on Accreditation of 
Healthcare Organizations: A Healthy Relationship?, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 16 (1994). 
 52. Id. at 18. 
 53. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3727.02 (1998). 
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health-care institutions.  These programs create a symbiotic relationship 
between the public entity and the private accreditor, under which the public 
agency is spared the trouble of devising its own standards and gains the 
flexibility and credibility of the private agency, while the private accreditor 
gains market share from the public regulatory endorsement as well as enhanced 
authority to enforce its regulatory decisions.54 
Finally, administrative procedures or judicial review have in some 
instances been imposed upon private entities by the courts or legislature.55  
Although employee benefit plans are created by private contracts between 
employers and insurers or plan administrators for the benefit of employees, 
their administrators are treated much like administrative entities under ERISA.  
The Department of Labor Regulations, for example, requires ERISA plans to 
follow certain claims and appeals procedures that look like those followed by 
public agencies.56  The courts have assumed an oversight relationship towards 
ERISA plans that resembles judicial review of administrative decisions.  
Courts generally require exhaustion of plan remedies before reviewing plan 
coverage decisions and generally review those decisions following an arbitrary 
and capricious standard.57 
Hospital staff privilege decisions offer another example of private 
decisions coming under the influence of something that resembles 
administrative law.  Even though staff privilege decisions essentially govern 
the relationship between professionals and private hospitals, courts in a number 
of states have required hospitals to follow “fair procedures” that closely 
resemble administrative procedures in making staff privilege decisions and 
have subjected privileging decisions to something resembling administrative 
review.58  The Health Care Quality Improvement Act goes one step further, 
essentially requiring hospitals to follow administrative procedures in exchange 
for antitrust immunity.59 
In sum, health law is thoroughly permeated by administrative law.  
Throughout health law one finds entities that are not popularly elected, that are 
not courts, and that either are in fact public administrative agencies or are 
private entities that resemble administrative agencies making rules and 
deciding disputes.  Some of these entities are established by statute and are 
 
 54. See Jost, supra note 51, at 25–38 (exploring these mutual benefits). 
 55. See generally DeBofsky, supra note 30. 
 56. See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (2003). 
 57. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 (1989) (courts should 
show deference to discretionary judgments of ERISA plans); Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 
566–68 (9th Cir. 1980) (exhaustion required before filing suit in ERISA cases). 
 58. See, e.g., Ende v. Cohen, 686 A.2d 1239, 1242–43 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997); 
Christenson v. Mount Carmel Health, 678 N.E.2d 255, 260 (Ohio Ct. App.1996); Rosenblit v. 
Fountain Valley Reg’l Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 282 Cal. Rptr. 819, 825 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). 
 59. 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a) (2000). 
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required by statute to follow specified administrative procedures; others are the 
product of private arrangements but have had administrative procedures 
imposed upon them by a legislature, the courts, or by regulatory agencies.  All, 
however, are subject to administrative law or something that closely resembles 
it. 
III.  WHY IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW SO PERVASIVE IN HEALTH-CARE LAW?  
THE HISTORICAL EXPLANATION EVALUATED 
Why is administrative law so pervasive in health-care law?  One possible 
explanation, put forth by Professor Claeys in his article in this symposium, is 
historical.  In particular, from the 1960s to the 1980s, there was extraordinary 
growth in the health-care industry and the emergence of health law as a distinct 
area of practice and academic discipline.  It was also a time of extraordinary 
ferment in administrative law.  It would not be surprising if there was some 
cross-fertilization between the two legal domains during this fertile time, if 
there was not some degree of “peer pressure” promoting the adoption of 
administrative entities and law as health law emerged.60 
What was happening in administrative law during this time?  Most 
noteworthy, there was a dramatic expansion of government regulation.  
Beginning with President Johnson’s Great Society, and continuing through 
much of the Nixon administration, a host of new regulatory programs were 
initiated. The programs focused on the environment and public health and 
safety.  Federal control over air pollution regulation was established through a 
series of laws adopted between 1963 and 1977.  The Occupational Safety and 
Health Act, creating a sizeable regulatory bureaucracy, was adopted in 1970, 
while the Federal Consumer Products Safety Commission was established in 
1972.  Responsibilities of existing agencies and departments during the 1960s 
and early 1970s were also expanded as new regulatory programs were 
created.61 
There were other trends under way in administrative law at this time as 
well.  One was a dramatic expansion of the use of rulemaking.  The 
Administrative Procedures Act had recognized the power in administrative 
agencies to regulate through quasi-legislative rules.62  For the two decades 
following its enactment, however, agencies continued to establish policy 
 
 60. Eric R. Claeys, The Food and Drug Administration and the Command-And-Control 
Model of Regulation, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 105 (2005). 
 61. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE 
REGULATORY STATE 24–31 (1990) (exploring the expanding responsibilities of existing agencies 
and departments in the 1970s); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 
STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1272–1315 (1986). 
 62. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000). 
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primarily through adjudication.63  As the scope of regulatory authority 
expanded in the “rights revolution” of the 1960s and 1970s, the agencies 
increasingly turned to rulemaking as a more expeditious and efficient means of 
setting policy.64  Two Supreme Court decisions, United States v. Florida East 
Coast Railway,65 and Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council,66 undoubtedly encouraged this trend.  As a result, 
there was more emphasis on agencies’ rulemaking (quasi-legislative powers) 
as opposed to the dispute resolution functions (quasi-judicial powers).67 
Many key health law regulatory initiatives date from this period.  Medicare 
and Medicaid were created in 1965.  The Professional Standards Review 
Organization program was established in 1972.  ERISA was enacted in 1974, 
as was the National Health Resources Planning and Development Act, which, 
though later repealed, established the state certificate of need programs, many 
of which still exist.  In general, the agencies created by these statutes 
proceeded to adopt rules using the newly invigorated informal rulemaking 
process, though many of these rules served to establish agency procedures 
rather than to impose regulatory requirements.68 The regulatory output of some 
of these entities was, however, quite modest.69 
When examined more closely, however, the hypothesis of “administrative 
peer pressure” goes only so far.  First, though social and environmental 
command and control regulation blossomed in the 1960s and 1970s, federal 
administrative law has much deeper roots, as does health law.  Calls for 
increased government regulation emerged from the Populist movement in the 
second half of the nineteenth century and from the Progressives at the end of 
the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth.70  Responding to this 
 
 63. Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1039, 1092–93 (1997). 
 64. Id.; see also BREYER ET AL, supra note 8, at 665–667. 
 65. 410 U.S. 224 (1973) (limiting the application of ponderous, formal, on-the-record 
rulemaking). 
 66. 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (limiting the judicial imposition of additional burdensome 
rulemaking requirements on agencies). 
 67. The late 1960s and early 1970s also saw an extraordinary burst of activity on the part of 
the courts, generally opening up agency procedures, expanding opportunities for the public to 
participate in regulatory programs, and engaging in more energetic oversight of administrative 
proceedings.  See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1975); Merrill, supra note 63, at 1059–1067.  This development is not 
directly relevant to our subject, however, and will not be explored here. 
 68. See, e.g., Imposition of Sanctions on Health Care Practitioners and Providers of Health 
Care Services by a Quality Improvement Organization, 42 C.F.R. pt. 1004 (2003) (governing 
Peer Review Organization sanction proceedings). 
 69. As of 1980, the Department of Labor regulations governing ERISA plan claims 
processes filled only four pages.  See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (2003). 
 70. See Rabin, supra note 61, at 1197–243. 
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pressure, the Interstate Commerce Commission was created in 1887, and the 
Federal Trade Commission in 1914.71  Administrative law flourished during 
the New Deal of the 1930s, when the power of the federal bureaucracy was 
expanded dramatically to cope comprehensively with the crisis of the 
Depression.72  Many agencies created during that time (the National Labor 
Relations Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation) continue to play an important role in 
regulation of our economy.  The Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 
adopted in 1946, recognized and confirmed (even as it formalized and 
restrained) the power that administrative agencies had gained during the New 
Deal.73  The APA formalized the models of notice-and-comment rulemaking 
and on-the-record adjudication that form the basis for subsequent 
administrative law.  It is these models that still predominate in health-care law, 
though, as elsewhere in administrative law, they have been modified and 
expanded during the intervening half-century.74 
Similarly, health law, including health-care administrative law, has roots 
that long antedate the 1960s and 1970s.  State and local public health 
regulation existed before the founding of the Republic and constitutes one of 
our oldest forms of administrative law.75  State medical licensure boards were 
established in the second half of the nineteenth century.76  State programs 
providing care for the mentally ill were well-developed by the end of the 
nineteenth century, while state and local programs for aiding the medically 
indigent were widespread even before the New Deal.77  At the federal level, the 
Food and Drug Administration began to oversee the safety of drugs in the early 
twentieth century, and federal medical assistance for welfare recipients began 
to appear in 1950.78  There was, therefore, a considerable administrative 
 
 71. Id. at 1206–07, 1223–24. 
 72. Id. at 1243–62; BREYER ET AL., supra note 8, at 21–24. 
 73. Rabin, supra note 61, at 1265–66; see also JERRY L. MASHAW et al., ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 9 (5th ed. 2003). 
 74. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Governing Medicare, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 39, 92–96 (1999).  
The use of informal guidelines and agency opinions has become common in administrative law, 
and an even greater extent in health law.  Id. 
 75. See Wendy E. Parmet, Health Care and the Constitution: Public Health and the Role of 
the State in the Framing Era, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 267, 285–302 (1992); see also Edward 
P. Richards, The Police Power and the Regulation of Medical Practice: A Historical Review and 
Guide for Medical Licensing Board Regulation of Physicians in ERISA-Qualified Managed Care 
Organizations, 8 ANNALS HEALTH L. 201, 203–08 (1999). 
 76. Timothy S. Jost, Oversight of the Quality of Medical Care: Regulation, Management, or 
the Market?, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 825, 827–31 (1995). 
 77. TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, DISENTITLEMENT?: THE THREATS FACING OUR PUBLIC 
HEALTH-CARE PROGRAMS AND A RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSE 67–79 (2003). 
 78. Id. at 80–82. 
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infrastructure in place in health law by the time the expansions of the 1960s 
arrived. 
The reach of health-care administrative law continued to expand, 
moreover, long after the activist 1960s and 1970s had faded into the 
deregulatory 1980s and 1990s.  Certainly, in health-care law, as elsewhere, 
there was some regulatory retrenchment during this period.  The National 
Health Resources Planning and Development Act was repealed in 1986 
(though many states retained their certificate of need programs (CON) after 
repeal, and some still remain).79  The Professional Standards Review 
Organization Program was reborn in 1982 as the Peer Review Organization 
program and soon lost much of its regulatory bite.80  Since then it has morphed 
into the Quality Review Organization Program, which eschews aggressive 
regulation in favor of educational interventions.81 
But other significant health-care regulatory programs were created or 
continued to expand during the 1980s and 1990s.  The federal nursing home 
reform program—one of our most prescriptive federal regulatory programs 
(though one tied to a financing program rather than a general command-and-
control program)—was initiated with new legislation in 1987.82  EMTALA, 
adopted as part of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1985, imposed an obligation on every hospital in the country that participates 
in Medicare and has an emergency room to screen and stabilize every patient 
who came to the hospital in an emergency, including active labor.83  The 
Medicare program moved in the 1980s from cost and charge-based payment 
systems that mimicked the private sector to administered price systems (DRGs 
for hospitals in 1983 and RBRVS for physicians in 1989) that required a much 
higher level of administrative intervention.84  Finally, and perhaps most 
dramatically, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
(HIPAA)85 exponentially expanded federal regulation of health insurance and 
of the privacy of health-care information.  Although the 1960s and 1970s, 
 
 79. Lauretta Higgins Wolfson, State Regulation of Health Facility Planning: The Economic 
Theory and Political Realities of Certificates of Need, 4 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 261, 269–
73 (2000–2001). 
 80. JOST, supra note 51, at 27–28. 
 81. See, e.g., OFFICE OF CLINICAL STANDARDS AND QUALITY, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., QUALITY IMPROVEMENT GROUP PROPOSED SUMMARY OF DRAFT 8TH 
STATEMENT OF WORK (May 13, 2004), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/qio/2s.pdf. 
 82. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, §§ 4201, 4214 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3, 1396r (2000)).  This program has in fact been relatively 
successful in improving conditions within nursing homes.  See John V. Jacobi, Competition 
Law’s Rule in Health Care Quality, 11 ANNALS HEALTH L. 45, 50–55 (2002). 
 83. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000). 
 84. See, e.g., David M. Frankford, The Complexity of Medicare’s Hospital Reimbursement 
System: Paradoxes of Averaging, 78 IOWA L. REV. 517 (1993). 
 85. Pub. L. No. 104-191. 
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therefore, certainly were a period of growth for health-care administrative law, 
the link between health law and administrative entities and programs both 
antedates and postdates this period, calling into question the proposition that it 
resulted from developments that occurred during this period. 
The most significant challenge to the thesis that health-care administrative 
law is a product of the activism of the 1960s and 1970s, however, is the fact 
that the classic command-and-control model of administrative law that 
characterized that period is not the predominant model of administrative 
regulation in health law.  The Environmental Protection Agency, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and the Consumer Products 
Safety Commission all promulgate rules with which all affected industries 
must comply.86  If entities fail to obey the commands of these agencies, they 
face sanctions.  In this way, these agencies attempt to control the activities of 
subject industries to promote the purposes of their enabling statutes.  Some of 
these regulatory programs are focused on particular industries or actors, but 
their prohibitions are usually general and directed to all affected persons. 
But, as noted earlier, although examples of command-and-control 
regulation can certainly be found in health-care law, they do not predominate.  
Rather, the prevailing models in health care tie regulation to licensure and 
certification, to financing, or to tax subsidies.87  Moreover, while the 
command-and-control regulatory agencies created in the 1960s and 1970s were 
public agencies (primarily federal), private regulation is very common in the 
health-care industry.  If the predominant examples of administrative law in 
health law were a product of “administrative peer pressure,” it would seem 
logical that it would look more like the prevailing models of regulation that 
emerged elsewhere during this time period. 
IV.  AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION OF THE LINK BETWEEN HEALTH LAW 
AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE 
But if the historical peer pressure explanation does not work, how does one 
explain the entwinement between health law and administrative law?  How 
does one explain the fact that entities that are administrative agencies, or 
function like them, and that apply and are bound by administrative law or 
something that resembles it, are ubiquitous in health care? 
One place to begin is with notions of institutional competence.  
Recognition that particular legal institutions have particular competencies or 
limitations for carrying out legal tasks was one of the key insights of the legal 
 
 86. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 9, at 87. 
 87. Professor Claeys identifies the licensure and certification model with the New Deal, 
though it goes back beyond the New Deal at least to the beginnings of professional licensure in 
the 19th century.  See Claeys, supra note 60; see also, Jost, supra note 76, at 827–31. 
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process school of jurisprudence.88  Although legal process theory has passed 
from fashion in jurisprudence, this approach remains in fact useful for 
understanding the allocation of responsibilities among institutions.89  Earlier in 
this article, four different institutions were identified that contribute to 
establishing rules and resolving conflicts—legislatures, courts, private 
ordering, and administrative entities.  Examining the capabilities, and the 
disabilities, of each of these sets of institutions sheds light on the question of 
why we end up with administrative entities playing a central role in governing 
health care. 
Congress and the state legislatures lay down the basic laws that govern 
health care.  These laws, in fact, establish most of the administrative entities 
that we consider in this essay and set the tasks that they are to pursue and 
sketching out the procedures that they must follow. 
Legislative bodies have long agendas, however, and cannot begin to attend 
to the details that are dealt with by administrative agencies.90  Their processes 
are often cumbersome and time-consuming, and they lack that agility and 
flexibility that is ideally possessed by administrative entities.91  Legislators are 
also generalists and cannot specialize in particular problems to the extent that 
administrative entities can.  Legislatures are particularly dependent on political 
contributors and exposed to lobbyists for powerful interests and thus may not 
always be best positioned to carry out the public interest.92  Because 
legislatures are exposed politically to an extent that administrative agencies are 
not, legislatures are sometimes content to shape the broad outlines of 
administrative programs, giving themselves cover with policy advocates but 
leaving the contentious details to administrators.93  Finally, many 
administrative programs, such as health-care financing programs, require 
millions of individualized determinations and could not possibly be run by a 
legislature.94  In sum, legislatures can and do establish and set the broad policy 
 
 88. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Introduction to HENRY M. HART, JR. & 
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION 
OF LAW li, lx–lxii (1994); Keith Werhan, The Neoclassical Revival in Administrative Law, 44 
ADMIN. L. REV. 567, 577–79 (1992). 
 89. Legal Process Theory has also been adopted by commentators working in the law and 
economics tradition.  See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING 
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994). 
 90. HART & SACKS, supra note 88, at xciii. 
 91. See LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 36–37 (1965). 
 92. GOSTIN, supra note 42, at 347–48. 
 93. See David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 
89 GEO. L.J. 97, 138 (2000).  This phenomena of legislative buck passing has also been noted by 
scholars in the public choice and positive political theory traditions.  David B. Spence, 
Administrative Law and Agency Policy-Making: Rethinking the Positive Theory of Political 
Control, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 407, 426–27 (1997). 
 94. HART & SACKS, supra note 88, at 846; JAFFE, supra note 91, at 37. 
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parameters for programs for administering health-care oversight programs, but 
they are not adept at running them. 
Many of the functions of health-care administrative entities are also 
beyond the capacity of the courts.  In our legal system, courts decide disputes 
between individuals or entities and are largely dependent on those individuals 
and entities to provide them with the information necessary to decide those 
disputes.95  They lack the capacity for independent fact-finding and, in 
particular, are not very adept at identifying and consulting all of the interest 
groups affected by particular decisions.  The courts, like legislatures, are 
usually generalists and lack specialized knowledge about complex fields, 
except insofar as the parties to the litigation before them provide them with this 
information.  The courts also have short attention spans, limited by the 
duration of litigation, and cannot take on responsibility for the ongoing 
implementation of policy decisions.96  Finally, the courts are even limited in 
their capacity for covering their area of core competency—deciding disputes.  
Courts would, for example, be quickly overburdened if they had to decide the 
literally millions of reconsiderations and appeals that arise in the Medicare 
program.97 
In sum, legislatures and the judiciary can make only a limited (though very 
important) contribution to setting the rules for governing the health-care 
industry or for resolving disputes that arise within it.  That leaves the two other 
approaches identified at the outset for carrying out these tasks—private 
ordering and administrative oversight.  However, while earlier discussion was 
concerned with approaches that were available generally to society when 
looking specifically at health care, a fifth institution comes into focus: 
professionalism and the use of professional networks and their institutions. 
 
 95. Gostin, supra note 42, at 339–40 (discussing the limitations of the courts in making 
health law policy).  For classic explorations of the limited ability of courts to determine 
“polycentric” issues in traditional civil litigation, see Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in 
Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281. 1292–98 (1976); see also Lon L. Fuller, The 
Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394–405 (1978). 
 96. The exception from this generalization, of course, is institutional reform litigation 
involving structural injunctions.  For a time, structural injunctions were seen as affording the 
courts a significant role in policy-making and administration.  See Chayes, supra note 95, at 
1288–1304.  In recent years, however, the courts have been generally hostile to institutional 
litigation, which has taken on a rather marginal role.  See Myrian Gilles, An Autopsy of the 
Structural Reform Injunction: Oops . . . It’s Still Moving, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 143, 161–63 
(2003). 
 97. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DISPARITY BETWEEN REQUIREMENTS AND 
RESPONSIBLE AGENCIES’ CAPABILITIES 1 (2003) (reporting 3.7 million Medicare Part B appeals 
filed at the first level in FY 2001).  By contrast, in FY 2003, 252,962 civil cases were filed in the 
federal district courts.  News Release, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business 
of the Federal Courts in FY 2003: Substantial Caseloads Continue to Fill Courts 2 (Mar. 16, 
2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/judbus03.pdf. 
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Health care is delivered by professionals.  These professionals relate to one 
another, to their patients, to institutions, and to governments as private 
individuals operating within markets and subject to ordinary social norms.  The 
terms under which health-care professionals deliver their services are to some 
extent governed by the general laws of supply and demand98 and are subject to 
the social norms that govern society, such as prohibitions against killing or 
stealing.  Professionals are also subject to oversight by a host of administrative 
entities, as we have already noted. 
Beyond societal norms and the laws of supply and demand, health-care 
professionals also function within professional networks and are subject to 
their own norms and institutions.99  Professionals often belong to professional 
associations, which have their own codes of conduct that may or may not be 
sanctioned by law.100  Some professional associations also assist in peer review 
or peer dispute resolution,101 a function that is often carried on informally in 
networks. 
Sociologists have long noted the unique characteristics of professionals as 
opposed to other occupational or social groups.102  In particular, they have 
observed that professionals have been able, to a considerable extent, to govern 
themselves through their own institutions, establishing their own ethical 
standards, entry requirements, and training programs, as well as the internal 
divisions and external boundaries of their professions.103  Although some 
economists have been highly skeptical about the claims of the professions to 
special treatment,104 Kenneth Arrow, in his famed essay, Uncertainty and the 
Welfare Economics of Medical Care, speculated that some degree of self-
governance within the health-care professions might make sense in the face of 
 
 98. See generally THOMAS RICE, THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH RECONSIDERED (1998) 
(taking the position that the laws of economics apply only imprecisely to health care).  The extent 
to which health-care professionals are or are not governed by these laws is a complex topic, 
which will be discussed further below. 
 99. See, e.g., ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC (2001); see also 
Deborah A. Savage, Change and Response: An Economic Theory of Professions with an 
Application to Pharmacy 32–33, 99–100, 140 (1993) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation) (on file 
with Homer Babbidge Library, Storrs, CT). 
 100. See, e.g., Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 614 N.E.2d 748, 751–52 (Ohio 1993) 
(recognizing that a doctor may be disciplined by a medical disciplinary board under Ohio law for 
violating the ethical standards of a professional association regarding sexual behavior). 
 101. See AM. HEALTH LAWYERS’ ASS’N, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION SERVICE 
(offering alternative dispute resolution services since 1992), at http://www.healthlawyers.org/adr 
(last visited on Oct. 4, 2004). 
 102. ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL POWERS: A STUDY OF THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF 
FORMAL KNOWLEDGE 1–62 (1986); ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN 
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 103. See, e.g., FREIDSON, supra note 99. 
 104. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 137–60 (1962). 
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failures that attended the market for medical services, most particularly those 
caused by problems of uncertainty.105  More recently, economist Deborah 
Savage has contended that professionals produce services neither as atomistic 
individual participants in markets defined by competition, nor as employees in 
hierarchically organized firms, but rather within professional networks that are 
largely self-governing.106 
Professionalism presents a distinct alternative to general private ordering.  
Professional norms, for example, are not identical to those that govern society 
in general.  Norms respecting honesty, for example, can be interpreted 
somewhat idiosyncratically in the professional-patient relationship,107 while 
professionals in relationship to their patients are held to a higher standard of 
propriety in sexual conduct than the standards that may govern relationships 
outside of a professional context.108  Even norms relating to killing may be 
bent when terminal care of a patient in terrible pain is at stake.109  Professional 
networks also result in behavior that can be characterized as market restraints.  
Professional ethical constraints, for example, have long limited physician 
advertising.110 
Both Deborah Savage and Eliot Freidson focus on the unique 
characteristics of professional knowledge as explaining the unique institutions 
of professionalism.  Professional knowledge (as opposed to other forms of 
knowledge) is complex, theoretical, largely tacit (unverbalized and often 
unverbalizable),111 and both routine, in the sense that services are performed 
similarly by the same professionals everywhere, and nonroutine (discretionary 
in Freidson’s language112), because it is applied differently in the situation of 
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8.14 at 230 (2002–2003). 
 109. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 736–37, 780 (1997) (O’Connor, J., & 
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extenuating circumstances). 
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 112. Id. at 31–35. 
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each individual patient.  Professional knowledge is shared among professional 
networks.  To quote Savage: 
I define professions as networks of shared competence. . . . For the purposes of 
this discussion, it will suffice to think of networks as non-hierarchical 
governance modes that manage shared capabilities.  Professional networks 
identify core competences, build capabilities, and institutionalize knowledge 
flows.  That is, professions store, acquire, develop, transmit, protect, and earn 
rents from their capabilities.  They compete with other professions and other 
organizations by attempting to take advantage of their capabilities more 
quickly and ably than others. 
  What is a shared competence?  The locus of professional production is a 
well-defined community of practitioners possessing an esoteric knowledge 
core (citation omitted).  Since this knowledge is tacit, or perhaps esoteric, it is 
hard to specify in explicit terms what it is that practitioners know.  We can, 
however, observe what they do.  Within a profession, the routines of individual 
practitioners exhibit certain similarities.  For example, lawyers evaluate 
whether a particular problem falls within the expertise of both the legal system 
and their own legal abilities.  That is, they select and evaluate problems using 
the same criteria, even if they reach different conclusions.  One source of their 
ability to do this is a shared background, usually because they have completed 
similar education and training programs and have shared work experiences 
(“practice”). 
  This means that the decisions of professionals, bringing to bear skills and 
knowledge in solving a production problem, follow what in the engineering 
profession is called “next bench design.”  What professionals can and will do 
depends on what the professional system can do.  Each professional’s 
decisions are constrained by the capabilities of the network as a whole, and 
their decisions must be implemented within the system. 113 
In this sense, professional competences are routines shared among 
individual practitioners.  In performing a routine, the individual professional 
wants to be sure that her activities “interface” with the routines of others.114  
Each individual practitioner represents embodied or human capital, often in the 
form of tacit knowledge, but the products and services that each produces 
require integration of this esoteric knowledge base across practitioners.115 
Savage argues that the creation, transmission, enhancement and application 
of such professional knowledge optimally takes place neither in markets 
composed of individual and atomistic competitors, nor in hierarchically 
organized firms, but in networks composed of independent yet linked 
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professionals.116 These networks, in turn, develop their own self-governing 
institutions that assure the transmission and enlargement of tacit and formal 
knowledge by controlling entrance into the profession and exit from the 
profession, boundaries of the profession, and ethical behavior within the 
profession.117 
The relatively benign explanation of the development of professional 
power by Freidson, Savage, Arrow and others is far from universally accepted.  
Critics such as Milton Friedman,118 Jeffrey Berlant,119 Paul Starr,120 Clark 
Havighurst,121 and others see professional autonomy and authority as the result 
of the exercise of political and economic power, largely lacking in legitimate 
economic or social justification.  For our purposes, however, it is not necessary 
to resolve this argument.  In fact, professionalism and professional networks 
have been accepted and continue to be accepted in the United States as a 
legitimate approach to making rules and resolving disputes.  The Supreme 
Court recently held that professional restraints on advertising by dentists must 
be handled differently than restraints on advertising would be handled 
elsewhere in the economy because of the unique characteristics of professional 
services.122  Congress and state legislatures continue to recognize professional 
certification and accreditation as acceptable alternatives to external 
regulation.123  Professionalism, legitimate or not (or, most probably, as 
partially legitimate and partially not) must be considered as yet another 
approach to legal ordering. 
Adding, then, the possibility of regulation of conduct through professional 
networks, we are left with three alternative approaches to governing the health-
care industry: private ordering through market forces and social norms, 
 
 116. Id at 16–57; see also FREIDSON, supra note 99, at 1–2 (making the same point from the 
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 117. Savage, supra note 99, at 99–141. 
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 120. See generally PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 
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administrative regulation and dispute resolution, and regulation and dispute 
resolution through professional networks. 
As a general matter in our liberal American society, we leave most matters 
to private ordering, i.e. to private contracts, firms, and associations operating 
within the framework of social norms and markets, unless there is a good 
reason to do otherwise.  However, no country in the world leaves health-care 
organization and finance purely to private ordering, and the United States is no 
exception.  There are several reasons for this phenomenon. 
First, and most basically, private arrangements cannot assure universal 
access to health care.  I have fully explained the reasons for this elsewhere and 
will only sketch them out here.124  The need for health-care services varies 
dramatically across our population, with a small percentage of the population 
consuming most of our nation’s health-care resources in any given year while 
half of the population uses virtually no resources at all.125  Those who use the 
most health-care resources, however, are not necessarily those who have the 
most financial resources; indeed, the contrary is often the case.126  To some 
extent this unequal distribution of resources and need is evened out through 
private insurance, but private insurers must necessarily steer away from those 
who can be predicted to have the highest health-care costs unless an insurer is 
able to charge rates that cover the increased risk, rates that would be 
unaffordable to many high-need persons.127  Even the rates charged persons 
presenting “normal” risks, however, are unaffordable to many low-income 
persons.  Unaffordability is one of the primary reasons one-sixth of our 
population is uninsured, and far more would be were it not for public 
insurance.128 
Some form of public health insurance is the most common response to this 
conundrum.  But public health insurance programs require eligibility, 
coverage, and payment rules; institutions to decide disputes involving these 
rules; and fraud and abuse enforcement mechanisms for dealing with those 
who do not play by the rules.  Under some circumstances, public insurance 
programs also rely on private claims processors or managed-care organizations 
in an attempt to appropriate the supposed efficiencies of private ordering for 
 
 124. See JOST, supra note 77, at 8–18. 
 125. See Marc L. Berk & Alan C. Monheit, The Concentration of Health Care Expenditures, 
Revisited, HEALTH AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2001, at 9, 12–13.  In any given year, 1% of the population 
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 126. See, e.g., Michael Marmot, The Influence of Income on Health: Views of an 
Epidemiologist, HEALTH AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2002, at 31. 
 127. JOST, supra note 77, at 11–14. 
 128. See KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, KAISER FAMILY 
FOUNDATION, THE UNINSURED: A PRIMER 2 (2003), available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/ 
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the benefit of public programs.129  In the United States, there have been 
attempts to maximize private insurance coverage in lieu of establishing public 
coverage.130  At the federal level, we have primarily pursued a carrot strategy, 
trying to encourage employment-related health insurance coverage by offering 
employers tax incentives and protection from state lawsuits (and to some 
extent regulation) through ERISA.131  The states have pursued more of a stick 
strategy, regulating individual and small group insurance markets to extend 
coverage through coverage mandates, preexisting condition bans, guaranteed 
issue and renewal requirements, and community rating requirements or other 
limitations on underwriting.132  Even putting aside the use of regulatory power 
to expand coverage, moreover, private insurance must in any event be 
regulated to assure solvency and fair claims practices.133  Insuring access to 
health care, therefore, inevitably requires some form of regulation. 
Though health insurance solves, to some extent, the problem of access to 
care within markets, it inevitably brings with it the problem of moral hazard.134  
The marginal cost of health care to insured patients is essentially the amount of 
cost-sharing obligations (plus transportation costs and the value of time spent 
receiving health care).  For some services and some patients, these costs may 
be very low.  Patients have an incentive, therefore, to consume insured health 
care regardless of whether the benefits of that health care exceed its costs.  
Professionals and providers also have an incentive to order, prescribe, refer for, 
or provide insured health-care products and services without carefully 
weighing the true cost and benefits because the products and services cost so 
little to the individual patient (and often produce a considerable benefit to the 
provider).135 
Insurers, public and private, attempt to combat moral hazard by changing 
the incentives of providers or by screening claims or the utilization of 
services.136  Medicare contractors, for example, screen against the provision of 
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 132. FURROW ET AL., supra note 11, § 9-4, at 474–82.  In recent years, the federal 
government has also begun to use command-and-control regulation imposing coverage mandates 
for persons who lose employment-related insurance, (COBRA), and limiting the use of 
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 134. RICE, supra note 98, at 82–84. 
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excess services.137  Fraud and abuse enforcement is another response to 
extreme manifestations of moral hazard.  However, aggressive utilization 
review may deny access to needed services or worsen inequities in access to 
health-care services.138  For this reason the state and federal governments 
mandate the provision of some services, limit the use of some forms of 
provider incentives, and impose internal and external appeal procedures on 
health plans.139 
Another commonly identified limitation of private ordering in health care 
is the lack of, or asymmetric availability of, information about health care.140  
The human body is infinite in its complexity, and when it malfunctions or is 
injured, patients often have little idea as to what is wrong or how to address the 
problem.  Patients seek out health-care professionals and providers for help, 
but they are rarely in a position to judge the competency of the professionals or 
providers whom they consult or to evaluate the information and assistance that 
those professionals and providers offer.  Even following an episode of 
treatment, a patient may not be able to evaluate retrospectively the quality, or 
even efficacy, of services received.141  The patient’s condition may well have 
improved without the treatment, or it may have gotten worse no matter what 
was tried.  Moreover, even professionals are often uncertain about what is 
wrong with a patient or how to treat the patient’s symptoms, though they are 
usually better informed than are their patients.  In this environment of 
information deficits, private ordering is problematic.142 
Patients in health-care markets not only lack quality of service information, 
but often price information as well.  Health-care treatment is often complex, 
involving a number of products and services and a variety of product and 
service providers.  It is rare that a patient can know beforehand exactly what a 
treatment will cost, even when it is provided by a single professional.  Indeed, 
a professional may not have any idea what a complex service is going to cost.  
Comparison shopping, therefore, is often difficult if not impossible.143 
 
 137. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A) (2000). 
 138. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 11, § 7-12, at 409. 
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Patients often rely on their physicians to make health-care purchasing 
decisions for them.144  Professionals also often have some power over the 
resources of health-care institutions.145  Health-care professionals are rarely 
single-minded in their allegiance to either the patient or the institution.  They 
must often keep in mind the interests of the patient, a health-care institution, an 
insurer or managed-care organization and last, but often far from least, their 
own financial and professional interests.  Simple ordering through private 
agreements in this context of conflicted agency is highly problematic. 
The traditional response to these problems of information and agency has 
been regulation. Professional licensure and certification reduce the patient’s 
risk in information poor and interest conflicted situations by putting a floor 
under the competency of and imposing ethical obligations on those who act as 
health care professionals.146  FDA approval of drugs and devices similarly 
helps to assure that prescribed drugs and devices available to consumers are at 
least for some conditions safe and effective.  Regulation has increasingly been 
used to encourage disclosure of information to consumers, increasing the 
ability of consumers to function in information-poor markets.147  Programs 
rating institutions or insurers are directed at improving the environment in 
which patients act as consumers.148  Institutional review boards play a dual role 
here, both making certain that research proposals meet requirements of 
scientific validity before human research participants are asked to sign up for 
them and also making sure that the information that participants receive prior 
to signing up for the research provides enough information to make a 
meaningful choice.149 
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Health-care markets arguably fail in other ways, further limiting the 
viability of private ordering.  Health-care purchasing decisions, for example, 
are attended by externalities that limit the effectiveness of consumer choice as 
the sole means of allocating resources.  My decision to forgo having my child 
vaccinated, for example, may result in the spread of an infectious disease to my 
neighbor’s child.150  My neighbor’s decision to seek medical attention for a 
serious, but treatable, medical problem may increase my welfare by relieving 
me from the burden of observing him in constant pain.151  Vaccination and 
other public health requirements, on the one hand, and public health insurance, 
on the other, may thus prevent negative or create positive externalities.  
Artificial constraints on the supply of health-care services can result in 
artificially high prices or low supply of products or services.152  These forms of 
market failure have been used to justify other regulatory interventions, notably 
the use of the antitrust laws. 
Although the most obvious alternative to private ordering through the use 
of markets is government regulation, defects in private ordering have also been 
addressed through professional self-governance.  Kenneth Arrow’s seminal 
article Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care observed that 
many of the organizational characteristics of the health-care industrythe 
nonprofit organization of health-care institutions, subsidization of medical 
education, and professional certification and licensure, make sense in terms of 
professionals attempting to maintain trust in the face of consumer 
uncertainty.153 Additional common examples of self-regulation by 
professionals include peer review of staff privileges in hospitals, accreditation 
programs, and Medicare Peer Review Organizations.154 
Professional self-regulation has continued unabated in the face of the 
growth of external regulation of health care in recent years.155  Indeed, it has 
recently received a boost from the Institute of Medicine’s work on quality of 
health care, which has been read as criticizing licensure agency discipline or 
tort liability-based approaches to quality oversight.156  Recent literature on 
“trust-enhancing” regulation also questions the value of external command-
and-control regulation as opposed to professional ethics.157  Although the worst 
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excesses of self-regulation, such as peer review of fees or absolute ethical 
prohibitions on advertising, have been squelched by the antitrust laws, the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in California Dental Association v. Federal 
Trade Commission recognized an ongoing role for professional self-regulation, 
indeed regulation of advertising, because of the unique characteristics of 
health-care markets.158 
The problem is that while professional self-regulation can be understood as 
serving the public interest by responding to information deficit and agency 
problems in health care, it can also be seen as restraining trade and facilitating 
the preservation and consolidation of professional power.  Indeed, Paul Starr’s 
The Social Transformation of American Medicine became the most influential 
vision of the history of American health care in the twentieth century because 
of its convincing description of how physicians had been able to parlay the 
control over medical knowledge afforded to them by the scientific revolution 
to gain political and economic control over health care as well.159  The scope 
the law had granted them for self-regulation played a key role in this rise of 
physician power.160 
One response to professional self-regulation could have been simply to 
outlaw it.  However, this response, though frequently debated, has never 
caught on.  In the end, the arguments of Freidson, Savage and others that 
health-care professionals have the best knowledge base for judging one 
another’s work has carried the day.  There is also a benefit to society in 
maintaining among professionals a sense of responsibility for self-criticism and 
peer oversight.161  As noted above, recent considerations of quality oversight 
have endorsed a continuing key role for peer review.  Moreover, given the 
political power of organized medicine, it would probably not be politically 
possible to replace peer review with external regulation.162 
The alternative that we have ended up with is a fourfold response.  First, 
the worst excesses of professional self-regulation, as has already been noted, 
have been outlawed, often as violations of antitrust laws.163  Second, 
professional regulation has been supplemented by external regulation.  The 
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Stark self-referral laws, for example, were adopted because professionals had 
failed to address an obvious, indeed embarrassing, problem of conflicts of 
interest in the medical profession.164  Third, the courts and legislatures have 
imposed upon peer review processes the harness of administrative procedure.  
In a number of states, the courts require bodies that credential hospital medical 
staff, for example, to provide “fair procedure.”165  The Health Care Quality 
Improvement Act goes even further, offering protection to hospitals that offer 
full administrative due process in staff privileging procedures.166  Finally, 
courts afford judicial review to those who are aggrieved by peer review 
proceedings.167  This form of review, however, resembles closely judicial 
review of administrative decisions, requiring exhaustion of in-hospital 
remedies and deferring to peer review findings of fact and application of 
decision-making discretion.168 
In sum, however, what has happened is that professional self-governance 
in health care has become subject to administrative law.  That is to say, 
professional self-governance has been recognized as a viable and legitimate 
alternative to public regulation, but the legislatures and courts have subjected 
professional self-regulation, to a considerable degree, to the same 
administrative law constraints imposed on public regulatory entities. This has 
also been true when private organizations have been used to achieve other 
public ends, such as the administration of public health-care financing 
programs.169  The result has been the phenomenon that is the subject of this 
paperthe dominance of administrative law in health care. 
At the outset we identified three types of health-care programs in which 
administrative law was found: financing tax-subsidy programs, licensure and 
certification programs, and private regulation.  The discussion just concluded 
suggests why these three types of programs exist and persist.  First, private 
ordering cannot assure universal access to health-care finance, and public 
regulation exists to oversee public financing, to expand private financing, to 
control moral hazard, and to police private insurer responses to moral hazard.  
Second, public licensing and certification programs exist to address 
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information deficiencies, real or perceived, in health-care markets.  Third, 
private regulatory programs exist to facilitate the functioning of professional 
networks.  These private regulatory programs are often brought under the sway 
of public administrative law, or something closely resembling it, to enhance 
the likelihood that they will serve the public interest. 
V.  HEALTH-CARE LAW AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: MARRIAGE MADE IN 
HEAVEN OR ILL-ADVISED? 
Having identified explanations as to the predominance of administrative 
law in health-care law, we must still address the final question presented, at 
least implicitly, by this symposium: Would we be better off without this 
dominance?  Are health law and administrative law inextricably entwined, or is 
their combination a marriage of convenience that can be disentwined when it 
results in inconvenience? 
This question can be usefully separated into two subsidiary questions.  
First, would our health-care system be better off without the pervasive 
presence of administrative entitiespublic and private?  Second, would it be 
better off without the influence of administrative law as such? 
The first question we have already discussed at some length.  What 
alternatives are superior to administrative oversight?  One answer is greater use 
of legislation and of the courts.  Private qui tam litigation in the courts 
enforcing a broad statutory prohibition against false claims offers one example 
of how this might work.170  The Civil False Claims Act,171 and in particular its 
qui tam provisions,172 has had a huge impact on the health-care industry.  The 
same could be said to a lesser extent of private antitrust legislation,173 or 
private RICO suits.174 
Our experience here, however, does not offer a great deal of 
encouragement for moving in this direction.  Private enforcement of public law 
has been criticized as distorting enforcement priorities, encouraging expensive 
litigation, and diminishing the predictability of the law.175 Its effectiveness has, 
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POL’Y 55, 137141 (2003) (describing problems with private enforcement under qui tam); see 
Bucy, supra note 170, at 6268. 
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in most instances, been enhanced when the effect of the governing statute has 
been clarified and magnified by the actions of an administrative agency.176 
A more challenging response is that we should rely on private ordering, 
and in particular markets, to take the place of administrative oversight.  This 
assertion enjoys broad support among politicians and considerable support 
among academics, though it is contested by others.  How one evaluates the 
capacities of private ordering depends in part on how seriously one takes 
market failures in health care.  If the problems of information and agency 
described above are in fact intractable, then internal and external 
administrative review are necessary to assure high quality and appropriate 
utilization in health care.  However, if information and agency problems in 
health care are in fact surmountable (if, for example, they can be solved by 
increased disclosure or by application of the internet), then administrative 
oversight may be superfluous, even harmful.  Even if one views market 
failures in health care as serious, it is arguable that administrative intervention 
makes things worse rather than better.  External bureaucratic oversight may 
create additional inefficiencies, exacerbating rather than solving problems. 
A great deal of ink has been spilled on this topic, and we cannot resolve it 
or even exhaustively describe it here.177  Suffice it to say, however, that it is 
not conceivable that we are going to completely abandon quality oversight 
regulation in the foreseeable future.  Professional licensure has been criticized 
for years and at the margins has been subjected to sunset legislation, but there 
is no significant political appeal to the idea of abolishing it and to letting 
anyone practice medicine who believes he or she can do it.178  Similarly, there 
is no political traction behind the idea of abolishing the FDA.  Alternative and 
complementary medicine remains largely unregulated, but even here there has 
been movement in the recent past toward more regulatory control.179 
 
 176. The HHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) regulates false claims.  The Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) regulate antitrust laws.  The compliance 
guidelines of the OIG are available at http://www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/complianceguidance.html 
(last visited Nov. 7, 2004). See Krause, supra note 175, at 91110 (describing the variety of 
informational tools available to the OIG for effecting compliance with the fraud and abuse laws). 
 177. One of the most intelligent and persuasive proponents of the position that health-care 
markets are not that different is Mark Pauly.  See, e.g., Mark V. Pauly, Is Medical Care 
Different?, in COMPETITION IN THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 19 
(Warren Greenberg ed., 1978).  In law, the most consistent and persuasive free-market advocates 
have been Clark Havighurst and James Blumstein.  See Clark C. Havighurst, I’ve Seen Enough! 
My Life and Times in Health Care Law and Policy, 14 HEALTH MATRIX: J.L. MED. 107 (2004); 
James Blumstein, Health Care Law and Policy: Whence and Whither?, 14 HEALTH MATRIX: J.L. 
MED. 35 (2004). 
 178. Timothy S. Jost, Introduction–Regulation of the Healthcare Professions, in 
REGULATION OF THE HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONS 1, 34 (Timothy S. Jost ed., 1997). 
 179. See for example the FDA’s recent move to regulate Ephedra.  Final Rule Declaring 
Dietary Supplements Containing Ephedrine Alkaloids Adulterated Because They Present an 
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Regardless of how this debate is resolved, administrative oversight of 
health care is likely to continue, indeed probably to increase, because of the 
inescapable public role in health-care financing.  For reasons explained briefly 
above, and at length elsewhere,180 a public role in insuring the public, or 
segments of it, for health care is inevitable.  If public money is going to be 
spent on health care, some control over the utilization of publicly financed 
products and services and protection against fraud and abuse is inescapable, 
and some public oversight of the quality and quantity of publicly purchased 
care is likely.  As long as we rely primarily on private health insurance to 
finance health care, regulation of private insurance to assure solvency and fair 
claims practices is necessary, and attempts to control underwriting to expand 
access to care are likely.181 
We can, of course, attempt to privatize public systems, and conservative 
commentators and health insurers and managed-care organizations that are 
likely to profit from privatization, will continue to push for this.182  Our 
experience with the Medicare+Choice program, however, demonstrates that 
privatization makes no sense in terms of efficiency and raises serious equity 
problems as well.183  The true cost of the Medicare Advantage program, which 
is also leaking out, underlines the high cost of privatization of public 
programs.184  In any event, privatization is likely to expand rather than contract 
regulation because it enhances the need to regulate participating insurers and 
managed-care organizations while not wholly obviating the need for regulating 
providers.  In sum, the pervasive involvement of administrative entities in 
health care is likely to remain for the foreseeable future. 
The final alternative that we have considered to public administrative 
regulation is private regulation through professional networks.  Peer review 
and self-regulation are likely to continue to play an important role in the 
health-care industry for the foreseeable future.  Indeed, professional power 
seems to be reasserting itself as managed care has receded.185  But professional 
 
Unreasonable Risk; Final Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 6788 (Feb. 11, 2004) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 
119). 
 180. JOST, supra note 77. 
 181. See Jost, supra note 130, at 472483. 
 182. See, e.g., TRUDY LIEBERMAN, SLANTING THE STORY: THE FORCES THAT SHAPE THE 
NEWS (2000) (documenting the campaign of the Heritage Foundation pushing the privatization of 
public health care provision). 
 183. GERALDINE DALLEK ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, LESSONS FROM 
MEDICARE+CHOICE FOR MEDICARE REFORM, POLICY BRIEF 5–7 (June 2003), available at 
http://www.cmwf.org/programs/medfutur/dallek_mclessonsforreform_pb_658.pdf. 
 184. See BRIAN BILES ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, THE COST OF PRIVATIZATION: 
EXTRA PAYMENTS TO MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PLANS, ISSUE BRIEF (May 2004), available at 
http://www.cmwf.org/programs/medfutur/biles_extrapayments_ib_750.pdf. 
 185. See David E. Grembowski et al., Managed Care and the US Health Care System: A 
Social Exchange Perspective, 54 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1167 (2002). 
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self-regulation is unlikely to replace public regulation any time soon.  Its 
usefulness is limited by its particular competencies.  There are some functions 
such as oversight of enforcement of the antitrust or fraud and abuse laws to 
which self-regulation is peculiarly unsuited, while oversight of other 
functions,186 such as approval or new drugs and devices is likely to require 
resources unavailable to professional networks.  Moreover, as noted above, 
transfer of authority from public to private regulatory entities does not 
necessarily mean that there will be less administrative law. 
In sum, our examination of institutional alternatives for governing health 
care leaves us with the conclusion that a prominent role for public or private 
administrative entities is going to continue indefinitely.  This leads us to our 
second and final question, however: Should administrative law continue to 
dominate health-care law? 
If the answer to the first question is that administrative entities, public and 
private, will continue to play a major role in overseeing health-care 
organization and finance, then the answer to this question would seem self-
evident.  Administrative law was developed, at least in part, to assure that 
administrative entities serve the public interest.  One can argue how well it 
does this, and one can certainly contend that it could be improved.  At its best, 
however, administrative law promotes principles of fairness, transparency, 
reflectiveness, non-discrimination, and accountability that are basic values in 
our legal system.  Administrative law offers the hope of making professional 
self-regulation more attentive to public values and making public and private 
regulation of health-care financing more equitable.  As long as administrative 
entities continue to play a major role in health care, administrative law will 
continue to oversee them. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Administrative law, therefore, will continue to be inextricably entwined 
with health law.  We will continue to argue about whether this should be so, 
but we are unlikely to ever totally eliminate the sway of administrative law in 
this area.  In the short term, indeed, the application of administrative law may 
increase rather than decrease, as we continue to struggle to expand access to 
health care, reduce its cost, and improve its quality.  We need to focus, 
therefore, on how we might improve the application of administrative law to 
health care, or even how we might improve administrative law.  What the 
marriage between administrative law and health care may need, that is to say, 
is not a divorce, but rather marriage counseling.  This is one of the potential 
contributions of this symposium, and it is a worthwhile enterprise. 
 
 186. The reluctance of the AMA to take on physician conflicts of interest prior to the Stark 
legislation illustrates this point.  See MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY, AND MORALS: 
PHYSICIANS’ CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, 3145 (1993). 
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